Followers demand leader competence, and nowhere is that more critical than in dangerous contexts. No amount of legitimate or legal authority is likely to command respect or obedience in a setting where life is at risk, whether in a war zone or on the side of a mountain. This is the ironic contradiction of the common stereotype of the military leader: an authoritarian martinet who commands subordinates who must robotically obey. That’s not how leadership in the military works, at least not the Army and the Marine Corps units we visited, and certainly not in combat. The average troop is likely to find court-martial to be a more attractive option compared to following the orders of an incompetent leader in a war zone. Only competence commands respect, and respect is the coin of the realm in in extremis settings. For example, witness the respect that this American soldier fighting in Iraq had for the leader of his unit:
He took charge every time that he needed to take charge. He was doing a hundred things, while I am down there doing one thing. At times, I knew he was overwhelmed, so I would hop up and say, "Hey, sir, I got the con [meaning "I can lead": originally, a reference to manning a conning tower], I can battle track [keep track of where everybody is in order to focus on fighting the battle], I got a lot to do with this, we have been together for a while, you need some rest." He was overwhelmed, but he handled it very well. He did everything that he had to do. He maneuvered the troop or parts of the troop when nobody else was around to do it. He did more than you could ask of him. (U.S. soldier, Third Squadron, Seventh Cavalry, Baghdad, Iraq)
Respect accrued from competence does not imply that in extremis leadership is merely technical or somehow emotionless or soft. Much to the contrary, dangerous settings often demand leadership styles that are unambiguous, pointed, and aggressive to the point of grating on followers. For example, consider how another American Marine described the leader of his unit:
I don’t like the guy. I don’t know how to deal with him when we get off work, but as far as being a professional and being out there in the trenches, he is a great squad leader. He [will do] the right thing, but sometimes it’s a very unpopular thing, because he’s the squad leader. I admire him. He definitely deserves the Marine Corps Achievement Medal for Valor. We put him in for that. (U.S. Marine, First Marine Division, al Hillah, Iraq)
Leadership in dangerous contexts places incredible demands on leaders, who view virtually all outcomes as related to their personal competence and ability. These leaders work hard to achieve situational awareness and control. Yet the truth about in extremis settings is that awful things happen, often without warning and without leader competence casting a deciding vote. Nonetheless, the perception of control and personal efficacy is critical to the functioning of an in extremis leader. Imagine trying to accommodate feelings of inefficacy in a setting where effectiveness is the only link to life itself. In contrast to those who lead in settings that are benign enough to allow finger-pointing and denial of responsibility, in extremis leaders tend to assume responsibility for outcomes, even when any objective observer would let them off the hook for circumstances obviously outside their control. Here’s how one leader described the disastrous outcome of a situation he was in charge of:
My worst day, well, back in 1980 something... , I forget when, it’s been so long and I try not to think about it,... I was instructing some students, and got invited onto a jump, onto a larger skydive,... there was a [high-speed, midair] collision, a friend of mine was tumbling through the sky, and I went down and missed him, and he went in [slang for hitting the ground at penetration speed and dying on impact]... That’s a performance failure. (Guy Wright, professional skydiver, leader of large-formation and world-record skydiving events)
Competence is the building block for leader-follower trust relationships in in extremis settings. As one might expect, then, the competence in extremis leaders exhibit must be authentic, like their leadership style. Organizations run by appointed leaders without legitimate competence can muddle through mundane events, but they will predictably crumble when pushed in a crisis that poses genuine threat. People in fear of their lives will not trust or follow leaders if they question their competence. The incompetence of bureaucratically appointed leaders exudes from this comment from a captured Iraqi soldier about officer appointments:
There is some kind of government decree that simple soldiers can go to the [Baghdad Military] Academy for six months, end up graduating as an officer. So you can see soldiers becoming officers. [Others] become officers without ever entering the military academy. Some of these are part of the Army of Amquds [Jerusalem]. And some of them are members of the [Baath] Party, and being members of the Party they become officers. They become officers without even special training or the like. All you have is the government decision and they become promoted to officers. So you find intelligence Muqaddim [sergeant], Amid [higher officers], their expertise is very weak because their schooling is limited and they have too wide experience [that is, no experience specific to the role], very limited throughout the years. It used to be before the [First] Gulf War, the officer who graduated first in their class at the military academy, they would go to like Sandhurst [the British military academy] or to India. So we are talking about a total of one or two or three officers from eight hundred graduating. The study at the military academy is a far cry or does not correspond to the reality of the battlefield. All of the studies are theoretical. The practical side or the practicum is not taken seriously. (Captured Iraqi soldier, Um Qasr, Iraq)
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